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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ERNESTINE B. HARRISON I 
Plaintiff and Responde:d, 
vs. I Case No. 
11370 
JACK M. HARRISON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant submits herewith his Reply Brief for 
the reason that Respondent does not come to grips with 
the issues as stated by Appellant and it appears that a 
further written argument from Appellant will be help-
ful to the Court. 
Respondent at page 3 criticizes the Statement of 
Facts of appellant charging him with omitting numer-
ous facts and evidence. Then Respondent proceeds to 
1 
adduce only evidence favorable to the respondent, point. 
ing out no evidence omitted by the appellant in his 
statement, and overlooking the fact that in this type 
of action the Court shall review all of the evidence. 
Stone v. Stone, 19 U. 2d 378, 431 P. 2d 802; 
Whitehead v. Whitehead, 16 U. 2d 179, 397 P. 2d 987· 
) 
Dearden v. Dearden, 15 U. 2d 105, 388 P. 2d 230; 
Steiger v. Steiger, 4 U. 2d 273, 293 P. 2d 418. 
Respondent makes many mis-statements of evi-
dence and states only one fact not included in the brief 
of appellant, namely, the fact that appellant has kept 
company with Lorainne Woodland, who was an em· 
ployee at the Data Processing Company. Appellant 
regards this as immaterial, there being no rule that 
when a marriage is destroyed the parties may not seek 
companionship elsewhere. 
Respondent's tactic in her brief is the same as her 
tactic at her second trial, namely, to attack Harrison : 
and attempt to make him look deceitful, crafty, and · 
untrue to his wife. She obviously succeeded in trial 1 
court and it is appellant's hope that this Court will 
give a dispassionate review of the evidence and the · 
case and not base its decision on whether or not the 
Court likes the Appellant. 
Appellant admits that the marital situation is a 
bad one and that feelings are and always have been · 
strong and explosive. The record of the first trial is 
not available but Judge Anderson found Appellant to 
2 
be ·aggressive'' (Finding 4, R (}7). Judge Anderson 
also was aware of the fact that appellant was keeping 
company with Loraine Woodland ( R 67) and with 
both aspects of the case before him gave the plaintiff 
and the children all they should have by way of divorce 
decree. 
Respondent's brief is devoted primarily to the 
argument that defendant's partnership should be ig-
nored, that the trial judge ignored it and that this 
eourt should look through the partnership and treat 
this case as though all Data Processing business were 
the defendant's personally and that the so called part-
ners are pawns and have no rights and no standing. 
The trial court found there was a partnership. (Finding 
of Fact No. 6, R (}8) . There was no issue raised in the 
.Jlotions to alter and amend the decree that the partner-
ship was a fraud or non-existent. ( R 98 and 104). There 
is no finding or conclusion that the partnership was 
a fraud or was not a real partnership. Judge Jeppson 
rnled that he could not ignore it (R 327 lines 23 to 31) 
and yet he did ignore it, in effect, by ordering pay-
ments which appellant cannot possibly pay without 
jeopardizing the financial welfare of the partnership, 
assuming that he could impair the partnership in 
an effort to pay the judgment,) and even made an 
award of one half of a non-existent account formerly 
0wned by the partnership, loaned to Keith Hawkes, 
and used completely in constructing a building owned 
b.1· the partnership. The Court made no finding as to 
the partnership and in her brief respondent ignored 
3 
this completely, without explaining how the partner-
ship can be ignored. 
There are issues of law involved herein, requiring 
analysis by the Court, and based upon certain funda-
mentals which appellant does not challenge: 
1. The parties are hostile. 
2. The defendant does not like to pay taxes if hr 
can avoid them honestly. 
3. One reason for the partnership is to share earn-
ings with his brother, mother and father. Other reasous 
were not explored and were not in issue. 
4. Defendant regards partnership matters as in-
cluding a separate entity and that the divorce action 
is against him and not the partnership. 
Before a second trial judge could modify tht 
Decree the following issues must be faced: 
I. Did the defendant conceal any assets of himseli 
or the partnership? 
2. Did the defendant testify falsely? 
3. If either one or two is answered affirmatively. · 
and we think they should not be, was there such conduct 
as amounted to extrinsic fraud as discussed by this 
Court in several decisions? 
4. If no relief is available on the issues of fraud 
and concealment, an entirely different question is prr-
sented, namely, haYe there been changed circumstanres, 
4 
and if so, what changes in the facts exist in June. 
rno8 as compared with December, 19Gu? 
5. Is the decision of the second trial judge a result 
uf passion and prejudice against the defendant? 
We shall briefly relate the contents of the two 
uriefs to these five issues, attempting to avoid repe-
tition. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Did the defendant conceal any assets of himself 
nr the partnership? 
This is covered at pages 32 to 35 of Appellant's 
brief. The respondent makes a statement of fact on 
this point at pages 16 to 18 of her brief. Respondent 
argues these facts as though there were some dispute 
about them. The account of $3,094.19 was in evidence 
at the first trial and the respondent testified that she 
had forgotten it. (R 313). There is no dispute in the 
nidence that the partnership had an account of money 
which it loaned to Keith Hawkes and recalled so that 
the building could be constructed. This plainly appears 
in the records of the partnership which were produced 
at the trial and there was not one word of testimony 
lha l at the time of the first trial there was any false 
statement in any of the records with reference to any 
of these amounts. And there is not one word of testi-
mony that respondent's attorney, Kenneth Rigtrup, 
a~kcd for any records which were not shown to him 
5 
or that he was shown any records which were inaccurate 
or tended to conceal any facts. 
At Page 18 of her brief just before the argument 
Respondent states that the original findings of fact · 
listed in detail all of the assets of the parties with family 
savings of $1,600.00 and assumes from this that thes
0
e 
were the partnership assets. 
The first trial judge was not confused. He had 
before him the partnership savings account of $3,094.19 
(Exhibit P-4) and also the account of $1,600.00 repre-
senting family savings as distinguished from partner-
ship assets. (Exhibit P-3). It was one-half of this family 
savings which was awarded to the plaintiff, and other 
assets of the parties individually consisting of stocks 
and bonds and the home were divided one-half to the 
plaintiff and approximately one-half to the defendant. 
(Conclusions 7 and 9, R 71) . To imply that the 
$1,600.00 of family savings should be contrasted with 
the partnership accounts of $3,094.00 and $9,729.00 
is an egregious affront to the intelligence of the first 
trial judge and the entire inquiry of the first trial 
which sought to distinguish between partnership prop· 
erty and the separate property of the plaintiff and the 
defendant. 
2. Did the defendant testify falsely? 
This is considered in Appellant's Brief, pp. 35-37. 
Respondent offers no support in her Brief for the find· 
ing of false testimony about income (Finding 4, R 115) 
6 
except for the unsupported and unsupportable accu-
sation of "defendant's perjured testimony regarding 
his income". (Brief, p. 21, line 2). 
Defendant gave an "estimate" of income in the 
form of Exhibit D-7 at the first trial. There is no evi-
dence of false testimony. The subsequent tax returns 
and report to Valley Bank were claims of income by 
defendant for specific purposes but his income as a 
one-third partner was one-third of the partnership 
profit of $23,688.29 for 1966. The actual cash of the 
partnership received by him in 1966 was not shown. 
(R 246-247) 
3. If either 1 or 2 is answered affirmatively, and 
we think they should not be, is there such conduct as 
arnounts to extrinsic fraud as discussed by this Court? 
This matter is discussed in Appellant's brief at 
pages 34 and 35 and in Respondent's brief at pages 
19 and 20. 
Both parties rely on Haner v. Haner, 13 Utah 2d 
299, 373 Pac. 2d 577, a portion of which is quoted 
by respondent. Respondent argues that the actions of 
defendant "were designed and had the effect of depriv-
ing plaintiff of the opportunity to litigate the issues in 
the divorce action, and a fair trial was effectively pre-
vented." On the contrary, Mr. Rigtrup alleged in his 
Amended and Supplemental Complaint: 
"Plaintiff is aware of certain assets which the 
Defendant has secreted, or diverted to his own 
7 
use, and based upon information and belief 
alleges that Defendant has so conducted hi; 
financial circumstances in such a fashion that he 
should be required to make a complete account-
ing of all financial transactions which he has 
entertained during the marriage, and should be 
further required to provide all of his record1 
pertaining to stocks, bonds, bank accounts, sar· 
in gs accounts, mutual funds, or any other records 
relating to his personal financial circumstances, 
and should be further required to provide all of 
the records pertaining to his business located at 
57 East Oakland Avenue, or any other business 
venture interest which he has acquired or ob-
tained during the coverture." ( R 3) 
It also appears that l\Ir. Rigtrup went to the part-
nership off ice and examined all of the records he asked 
for (R 242) and at that time which was June, 1960, 
the partnership savings account was still in the partner-
1 
ship name and was available to }\fr. Rigtrup. Also 
available were gross receipts and all accounts of the 
partnership business. ( R 245) . 
The question discussed in Haner is whether the 
alleged conduct "has the effect of depriving the other 
party of the opportunity to present his claim or defense. 
* * * To prevent them from contesting the issues * * * 
preventing the attendance of the parties or witnesses; 
or by destroying or secreting evidence * * * ". There 
is no suggestion in this record that plaintiff did nut 
have a fair trial, did not contest the matter, and there 
is no evidence whatsoever that any issue was ,rithhcld 
or that there was any evidence destroyed or secreted 
8 
L 
Respondent in the second trial charged both fraud 
and concealment and change of circumstances. The 
evidence was therefore admissible on one issue or the 
other and it was not possible to submit this question 
on a ruling of evidence. 
4. If no relief is available on the issues of fraud 
and concealment an entirely different question is pre-
sented, na7nely, have there been changed circumstances, 
and if so, what changes in the facts exist in June, 1968 
as co1npared with December, 1966? 
The only reference to this issue in the Findings 
of Fact is the last clause of Finding No. 4, which refers 
to deliberate misrepresentation of income: 
"That in addition thereto Defendant's income 
has increased substantially since the time of the 
entry of the decree." R ( 115) 
The Conclusions of Law and the "Judgment and 
Amended Decree" ( R 111 - 118) are silent on the matter 
of changed circumstances. That is why the matter was 
1 not stressed in Appellant's brief (See pages 30 to 40). 
No finding of fact was made to indicate what the Court 
believed the income to be and in her brief (Pages 10 
and 11) Respondent is equally vague and concludes 
that the income from the partnership in 1967 of 
$.'35,000.00 all belongs to the Appellant, ignoring the 
partnership. (Res. Brief p. 23) 
In December, 1966 the estimated income of Appel-
lant was at the rate of $9,000.00 per year. A three way 
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split of partnership income for that year would entitle 
Appellant to one-third of $23,198.29 (one-third of lim 
14 plus line 27 from page 1 of Exhibit P 23). 
In 1967 this income increased to one-third of 
$34,465.30. (Exhibit P-3) 
In June, 1968 there are no accurate figures and 
only estimates. Gross !)ales for the first five months of 
1967 were $48,146.57 (Exhibit P-9) and gross deposits 
in the partnership account for the first five months of I 
1968 were $49,034.93 (Page 15 of Respondent's Brief; : 
R 258). Appellant testified that business was off and ; 
that profits would be down for 1968 (R 217). 
Appellant submits that a more critical question is I 
whether Appellant had any money available to pay to I 
the respondent. In 1967, according to his calculation, : 
he paid $9,203.86 for taxes and to the Respondent, '. 
leaving him for other uses $2,100.00 (R 237). 
He testified that all of his personal spending was 
handled through the partnership account as No. 950 
( R 194 and 200) and it appears from an examination . 
of Exhibit P-5 that some of the payments on alimony : 
were listed in account 209. 
i 
All disbursements of the partnership for 1967 arc · 
shown in Exhibit P 5 totaling $135,642.31. This total 
was made up of the $96,000.00 of gross sales, plus the 
proceeds of the loan at Valley Bank of $2.t.,OOO.Oil 
(R 213) plus about $14,000.00 in savings accounts and 
proceeds of other receivables (R 215). 
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An analysis of this exhibit shows that the total of 
account Nos. 950 and 209 were $10,950.92. Payments 
to Ernestine Harrison and to American Savings and 
Loan on those two account numbers total $4,851.23 
and $1,190.00 or $6,041.23. Payment of taxes was 
$1,1177.21 charged to account 950 and payments of 
rent on account 950 were $770.00; attorney's fees were 
$225.00. It appears that Account 420 was the building 
and that payments into that account and to Van Ash 
Construction Company totaled $33,055.79 and pay-
ments on the land went to Construction Realty in the 
amount of $6,249.83. 
These figures reconcile very well with Appellant's 
testimony and with his statement that there were some 
accounts on the building still unpaid (R 214) 
Appellant testified that in June, 1968, outstanding 
1 
partnership payables were $8,939.83 (Exhibit D 19, 
· R 234) and that his personal obligations unpaid were 
$5,762.78 (Exhibit D 20, R 235). 
The partnership has no cash surplus, the defendant 
has no available cash but is being drained of cash by 
1 payments to and for his wife and children under the 
i original decree. Respondent had no money in June 
1968. In December 1966 there were some cash assets 
lo he divided. 
At pages 12 to H of her brief Respondent argues 
that Appellant received some benefits from partnership 
expenses which were deductible for tax purposes. It 
11 
is true, for instance, that if the partnership paid part 1 
of the rent because defendant used his apartment as an 
office, his living quarters could be better than they 
otherwise could be, to an extent which cannot accurately 
be determined. · 
But these items do not constitute any change of 
circumstance; and if defendant receives some benefit 
from some items in June, 1968 they are the same as 
he received in December of 1966 .. Mr. Rigtrup argued 
all of these matters in his .Memorandum to the Court, 
thus indicating that these accounts were analyzed by 
Mr. Rigtrup and presented to the Court in evidence 
(R 135}. ; 
In short, the partnership had a better year in 1967 I 
than in 1966, and 1968 appeared to be about the same 
as 1967. If it were not for the burden of constructing 
the office building defendant undoubtedly would hm 
some cash assets and an increase in alimony and support 
money might have appeared appropriate. But all things 
considered there were no changes in circumstance jus-
tifying substantial adjustments of alimony and support. 
5. Is the decision of the second trial judge a result 
of passion and prejudice against the defendant? 
No justification appears in the record for awarding 
the house entirely to the respondent rather than one-
half to each, since there were no changed circumstances 
with reference to that. No justification appears in the 
record for the Court on its own motion ruling that Mr 
12 
, Rigtrup should be paid by the defendant for services 
rendered in the first trial, the reasonable value of which 
Judge Anderson fixed at $650.00 so far as defendant's 
responsibility goes. 
No justification appears for giving a garnishee 
judgment to the plaintiff of partnership funds on deposit 
at the Valley Bank and Trust Company and for award-
ing one-half of partnership savings as they existed in 
1966 and were invested in the construction of an office 
building in 1967. 
The increase of combined alimony and support 
money from $375.00 per month to $900.00 per month 
when the defendant has no money and owes his creditors 
and the plaintiff's living expenses are $571.00 per 
month (R 279) plainly indicate that the second trial 
judge either was mislead by pretended evidence or 
made a decision as a result of passion and prejudice 
against the defendant-appellant. 
A new trial should have been granted, or else addi-
tional evidence required at that time for the purpose 
of obtaining accurate evidence on the theory of change 
of circumstances since there was not sufficient evidence 
to support concealment of assets or false testimony as 
lo income, both of which were argued from conjecture, 
without presenting the evidence in the record and testi-
mony of Mr. Rigtrup. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS & WATKINS 
AND RICHARD L. BIRD, JR. 
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